While refuting the Yogacara tenets of "mind-only" (kk.17-54) and "imagined nature" (kk.55-68) in the MHK, Bhaviveka reveals his own understanding of the object of perception. It is true that the objective support (alambana) of cognition is, according to Bhaviveka, an aggregation of atoms. However, it should also be noted in his discussion that the aggregation of atoms is not strictly the "object" of cognition but is rather the "cause" of cognition in which the aggregation appears as a certain "form- As is well-known, it is this theory of perception that made Bhaviveka later known as the forerunner of the so-called *Sautrantika-Madhyamika5), though a similar understanding of perception had already been givenby the Sarvastivada school6).
However, noteworthy is the subtle but significant difference to be found between Bhaviveka's above explanation and that of the Sarvastivada. Unlike the latter's traditional understanding, it is clear that Bhaviveka accepts the aggregation of atoms as the objective support of perception only in the sense that it causes the occurrence of the cognition in which it appears (tadabhamatihetu).
Thus, we may strictly say that, according to Bhaviveka, the "object" of perception is in fact the appearance or representation of the objective support but not the ag-gregation itself since the latter is nothing more than the "cause" of the cognition which bears the appearance of the aggregation. (de la gzugs ma yin zhes bya ba ni gzugs las gzhan pa ste/ sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg pa dag go// gzugs ma yin pa'i bdag nyid ces bya ba ni gzugs ma yin pa de dag gi bdag nyid de/ rna ba la sogs pa'i yul zin pa dang zin pama yin pa dag la sogs pa dag go// rnam par bcad pa'i zhes bya ba ni gzugs ma yin pa'i bdag nyid de dag las rnam par bcad pa (104) Bhaviveka's Theory of Perception (A . SAITO) ste/ mtshan nyid tha dad pa'o// de'i dngos po zhes bya ba ni mig gi yul te/ kha dog dang dbyibs kyi bdag nyid do// der snang ba zhes bya ba ni de'i ream par snang ba'o// Hoornaert [2001] pp.16-17; D Dza 215b2-4, P Dza 239a6-8) The above explanation speaks clearly of Bhaviveka's characteristic understanding of perception already examined in the preceding sections. In this stanza, Bhaviveka refers to form-and-color as the actual object (gocara) of cognition, which possesses the appearance of the entity, form-and-color, excluded from those having the nature of non-form and non-color. The negative expressions such as "arupatmavyavacchinnavastv-" and anyabhinnarupasya vastuno (k.68) etc.12) are commonly used in his theory of both perception and meaning. Here also may be found the influence of Dignaga's apoha theory on Bhaviveka, though, as was discussed in my earlier paper, Bhaviveka is critical of the apoha theory of meaning. The word vastu is herein used in the sense of a certain dharma, e.g. rupa excluded from sabda, gandha, rasa, and sprastavya. Further, taking the above-cited stanza 36 into consideration, it can be noted that the actual object of cognition (matigocara) in this verse has the same meaning as the cause of cognition (matihetu) in which the object appears as a certain `form and color' .
From the above discussion, we may safely draw the following conclusions. First, concerning his theory of perception, Bhaviveka takes the aggregation of atoms as the cause of cognition in which it appears. It is in this sense that Bhaviveka regards the aggregated atoms as the objective support (alambana) or the actual object (gocara) of perception. Secondly, this theory of perception of Bhaviveka's more or less agrees with that of the so-called "mDo sde [spyod pa'i] dBu ma pa (*SautrantikaMadhyamika)" as depicted in the Tibetan doxographical tradition 13). Thirdly, it is interesting to note that this scheme of epistemology seems to have been followed by Dharmakirti with the new term atisaya, "a pre-eminent quality" of the aggregated atoms. 
